evidence is brought to bear on policy problems across diverse regime types. Eyjafjallajökull have in common? All were based in part on the use of mathematical models, 3 which has been one of the defining features of public policy-making in recent decades. This 4 widespread and prominent role for modelling has many drivers. It stems in large part frommore participatory methods such as scenario planning to explore them. In this paper, we 1 argue that this is only part of the story. 2 
3
We suggest instead that factors such as the degree of uncertainty, complexity, and decision 4 stakes are not simply characteristics of problems. Rather, problem characteristics and types 5 of governance constitute one another; they are co-produced (Jasanoff, 2004 ). What we 6 mean is that the risk-based type, for example, does not simply lend itself to problems that 7 are well-structured, largely technical, and mathematically tractable. Instead, it also 8 constructs problems as holding the aforementioned characteristics, through the particular 9 ontologies, frames, methods, and types of evidence that it draws upon or applies (Shackley 10 et al., 1996; Clifford and Richards, 2005) . Put another way, particular types of governance 11 regime reveal, clarify, or suppress particular dimensions or characteristics of a problem, in 12 part determining whether they are bracketed as well-characterised rather than ambiguous. 13 And so to understand what constitutes quality in models-for-policy, we need to think about 14 both the characteristics of the policy problem and the nature of the governance regime. 15 Renn, Funtowicz, and others have emphasised the former; we focus on the latter. 16 
17
Another development is the recognition that mathematical modelling is but one approach 18 to analytical reasoning. For example, categorization tasks where multiple sources of 19 evidence are relied upon, whose quality and strength cannot be specified in advance, are 20 perhaps better suited to qualitative weight-of-evidence approaches than to mathematical 21 modelling. Similarly, problems where there is limited analytical basis for defining or 22 attaching probabilities to hazardous scenarios -such as threats to nuclear weapons 23 complexes (Nuclear Studies and Radiation Board, 2011) -may be more suited to techniques 24 for structured deliberation (e.g. the Delphi method; Linstone and Turoff, 1975) . Finally, 1 various forms of reasoning by analogy -often misperceived as merely a lay method -have 2 been used to inform public and environmental health policy (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2008) . Indeed, 3 climate science has a long tradition of supplementing mathematical models with the use of 4 temporal and spatial analogues in scenario development (Mearns and Hulme, 2001 ). This 5 analogical approach is sometimes proposed as a check against the perceived indeterminacy 6 -and potential for bias or strategic misrepresentation -encountered in those contexts 7 where model outputs are particularly sensitive to arbitrary assumptions (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 8 2008; Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2001). The general point is that in these situations, the 9 question of model quality should consider the strengths and weaknesses not just of 10 proposed models, but also relative to alternatives to mathematical modelling. 11
12
To summarise: model quality is now broadly accepted to be a multi-dimensional concept; 13 quality evaluation is seen as an intrinsically comparative task; and quality is viewed as a 14 function of how the model relates to the policy problem it was designed to address. 15 However, many of the non-technical dimensions of model quality are difficult to formalise 16 and so there is considerable ambiguity surrounding how they might be taken account of 17 during model building and evaluation. In what follows, we introduce and apply a typology of 18 governance regimes that helps clarify these broader dimensions of model quality and shows 19 how the emphasis placed on them differs by regime-type. Throughout, we emphasise the 20 implications of this for the uptake -or neglect -of scientific evidence in concrete policy 21 settings. 22 is the proper ethical framework for decision-making. In particular, we identify and 14 characterise a set of regime types that determine the quality criteria for models and 15 evidence from models: risk-based, precautionary, adaptive and participatory ( Figure 1) . 16 Although these regime types vary along a number of dimensions, we suggest that three in 17 particular are significant: a) knowledge as abstract vs. knowledge as contextual; b) process 18 orientation vs. outcome orientation; and c) high vs. low deference to formal expertise 19 ( Figure 1 ). These conceptual distinctions are not exclusive when it comes to concrete 20 empirical examples. A further clarification is that particular regimes are neither 21 homogeneous nor static, but are composed of a multitude of evolving networks of actors, 22
JUDGING THE QUALITY OF MATHEMATICAL MODELS REQUIRES

1
ATTENTION TO GOVERNANCE TYPES
institutions, and political contexts. Some of the examples we discuss illustrate this. In short, 23 whilst our typology is necessarily an idealised one, it stands or falls based on the 1 explanatory work that it does when confronted with empirical cases, as in this paper. Our 2 analysis begins with a comparison of the risk and precautionary regime types, before 3 turning to discuss adaptive and participatory regimes, once more highlighting contrasts and 4 compatibilities with the risk-based approach. 5 6 4.1 Risk-based vs. Precautionary Regime types 7
Basic features of the risk based regime type 8
Risk based approaches ( Figure 1 ) are rooted in theories of probability and utility 9 maximisation (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Savage, 1972) . They seek to characterise how the 10 future might unfold if a policy maker was to undertake a particular course of action, using 11 utility functions to determine which outcome is best or optimal (i.e. consistent with known 12 preferences) (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). The future is conceived of as amenable to empirical 13 investigation -within limits -and uncertainty is represented using standard decision-14 theoretic concepts (e.g. probability distributions on uncertain variables). As such, 15 probabilistic risk assessment combined with cost-benefit analysis is often held up to be the 16 gold standard of policy analysis in risk-based regimes (e.g. Sunstein, 2002 ; Graham and 17 Wiener, 1998; Löfstedt, 2011) . This ties in with the fundamental goal of such regimes of 18 making coherent decisions under uncertainty and within resource constraints (Pate-Cornell, 19 1996) . Of course it is broadly accepted that risk analysis can never solve actual problems -20 as they are infinitely complex -but only idealisations of them (Jaynes, 2003; Savage, 1972 The risk based approach is best suited for problems whose structure is sufficiently 6 developed such that the full decision-theoretic apparatus can be applied (ibid.). However, 7 this is not always the case in practice in environmental and public health applications, where 8 problem structures may be ambiguous, there is often a lack of reliable data, and decisions 9 may be urgent. In such situations, inexact, heuristic methods of problem-solving must be 10 relied upon (Jaynes, 2003 "uncertainty does not justify inaction") that are consistent with a risk-based approach, albeit 18 sometimes lacking clear operational meanings (more on this later). In contrast, the strong 19 version is quite distinct from the risk-based type, and involves a minimax approach to 20 decision making (i.e. concerned as much with equity as with efficiency, and with avoiding 21 worst case scenarios rather than identifying optimal solutions), a shifting of the burden of 22
proof from the regulator to the regulated, and a preference for false positives over false 23 negatives. 24 
Risk and precautionary conceptions of model quality: examples and issues 2
The contrast between the US EPA's approach to existing chemicals regulation (under the 3 Toxic Substances Control Act) and that of the Stockholm Convention can be understood in 4 terms of risk vs. precaution. The former's risk-based regime follows the classical, data-5 intensive four-step process of risk assessment to generate a probabilistic measure of harm 6 (hazard identification, dose-response modelling, exposure assessment, and risk 7 characterisation), and further relies on mathematical modelling to characterise the 8 expected costs and benefits of policy options. This contrasts with the precautionary 9
Stockholm Convention, which was developed in response to the perceived failings and 10 gridlock associated with risk-based regimes. Here, simple threshold models of persistence This reflects the fundamental distinction between minimax approaches to decision-making 23 (strong precaution), and those that aspire to rational choice (i.e. risk-benefit balancing). 24 Similarly, the rise of risk as perhaps the trans-national approach to governing climate change 1 (Pidgeon and Butler, 2006 ) -in contrast to its more precautionary origins -led to the 2 growing use of probabilistic modelling as a way of accommodating uncertainty. This 3 included early attempts to attach probabilities to climate scenarios (Dessai and Hulme, 4 2004), the Stern Review and its analysis of climate futures within the cost-benefit 5 framework (Stern, 2006) , and more nascent programmes seeking to determine the odds 6 with which severe weather events can be attributed to human influence (e.g. Pall et al., 7 2011 ). What seems to be happening here is members of a modelling community adapting 8 their methodological practices in attempts to align with the rationale of risk governance 9 (and so maintain or enhance their policy relevance). 10 
11
As we touched on earlier, there are weaker interpretations of precaution that do not 12 necessarily conflict with the risk-based type (e.g. paying a healthy respect for the limits of 13 our ability to assess uncertain risks, not using uncertainty as a reason or avoiding regulatory 14 action, etc.) (Wiener and Rogers, 2002; Wiener, 2003; Stewart, 2002) . Although these 15 notions are sometimes rather vaguely stated, they can in principle be incorporated within a 16 decision-theoretic framework if refined and formalised (Stewart, 2002) . We see moves 17 towards this in proposals to incorporate precaution within the framework of cost-benefit 18 balancing, such as the European Commission's 2000 communication on the precautionary 19 principle. The idea here is to qualify the broad principles of weak precaution with the ideas 20 of proportionality and cost-benefit balancing, which is entirely coherent (Wiener and 21 Rogers, 2002). To give a concrete example of how this might play out, one might express a 22 healthy respect for "surprises" via relatively flat probability distributions (Stewart, 2002) . 23
The point here is that modelling practices can be adapted in ways that ensure that the 24 evidence they produce is coherent with more than one regime type, without sacrificing on 1 technical quality or muddying the interpretation of analysis outputs. However, at other 2 times the representation of precautionary ideals within risk-based approaches has been 3 done rather informally. This can mean that analysis outputs are difficult to interpret, and 4 potentially lead to skewed policy making (Majone, 2002) . A perhaps extreme case in point is 5 the modelling practices underpinning the design of the New Orleans' storm surge protection 6 system, which had elements of both precautionary and risk-based approaches. Specifically, 7
we refer to the adoption of "worst case" assumptions (strong precaution) in defining the 8 standard project hurricane, which sat alongside the use of cost-benefit ratios in setting 9 design standards. Although there were myriad other technical and institutional failures 10 implicated in the subsequent breakdown of the levée system, one element of proposed 11 reforms has been a call for greater modelling coherence. regularities that can be readily extrapolated across space, time, and context, which is more 17 characteristic of the risk-based regime type. The latter point does not imply that risk-based 18 regimes neglect the question of model uncertainty; but there is a persuasive critique that 19 they tend to focus on its more mathematically tractable forms (e.g. probability distributions, 20 sampling error), to the neglect of indeterminacy and ignorance (e.g. Shackley and Wynne, 21 1996; Stirling, 2012) . This again contrasts with adaptive regimes, whose emphasis on 22 robustness implies that they will be particularly sceptical of model outputs that may be 23 strongly conditioned by unexplored assumptions (Schindler and Hilborn, 2015) . 24 
Adaptive conceptions of model quality: examples and issues 2
The above contrasts are highlighted by a consideration of the degree to which modelling is 3 "rule-bound." By rule-bound, we mean that the building and running of a model are strength of evidence is required to overturn them, and on the extent to which they should 23 be binding (NRC, 1983 (NRC, , 1994 (NRC, , 2009 ). Although the controversy surrounding defaults is often 24 interpreted as a conflict over conservatism in risk analysis, this element only relates to the 1 question of which particular defaults to establish (i.e. how, if at all, "risk averse" the defaults 2 should be). It fails to relate to the broader debate about whether to have default rules in the 3 first place, and about the extent to which they should constrain modelling practices. In our 4 view, this is better interpreted as a conflict between the risk-based logic of objectivity, 5 consistency, predictability, and constraining discretion on the one hand, and the adaptive 6 logic of learning, flexibility, and individualised judgement on the other. Highly rule-bound 7 modelling practices are in a sense quasi-deterministic, in that they impose a set of 8 constraints such that, for a given data set, a narrow range of outputs carry presumptive 9
force. And of course determinism, and its close cousin formal optimisation, has traditionally 10 been viewed somewhat sceptically by proponents of adaptive governance. This is on the and Hulme call a degree of "plasticity" (2011). This is closely related to the idea of treating 8 methodological principles as heuristics rather than laws, and in concrete terms meant that 9 local modelling teams were able to adjust the model parameters and inputs to reflect their 10 own particular places and knowledge. On this reading, PRECIS was a successful effort to 11 balance methodological consistency and objectivity (the risk-based type) with flexibility, 12 accommodation of local knowledge, and interpretive space (the adaptive type). 13 
14
The Participatory Regime Type 15
Basic features of the participatory regime type 16
The fourth regime in our typology is participatory (Figure 1 ). These regimes evaluate the 17 quality of decisions not according to means-ends rationality, but according to their 18 adherence to (a conception of) democratic ideals. As such, they place a high degree of 19 importance on engaging the public(s) in framing, evaluating, and deciding how to handle 20 governance dilemmas, and are particularly sensitive to avoiding coercion within this process 21 (Stirling, 2006; Dryzek, 1990; Habermas, 1975) . Their organising principles are that "risk 22
issues" are public issues with a technical dimension (not the reverse), and that public values 23 and preferences emerge from a rich combination of discursive practices and practical 24 reasoning (rather than pre-exist them). Accordingly, they tend to place a premium on using 1 models that are transparent and understandable to a range of audiences, and that provide 2 space for lay or local knowledge, expertise and framings (e.g. in specifying relevant outcome 3 variables, parameter estimates, or plausible scenarios; Stirling, 2006; Yearley, 2000; Ravetz, 4 2003) . By contrast, they will look unfavourably on methodological approaches that are 5 excessively complex, or that impose particular framings (e.g. through lacking explicit 6 treatment of option definition, or having hardwired model structures; McIntosh et al., 7 2005 ). They will be similarly sceptical of models that contain proxies for public values and 8 preferences (e.g. measures of willingness-to-pay), or are constructed and evaluated by a 9 technical elite (Stirling, 2006) . 10 11
Participatory conceptions of model quality: examples and issues 12
The UK Government's current approach to health technology appraisal illuminates some of 13 the issues sketched out above. This approach, beginning with the establishment of the 14 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1999, is a mixture of clinical (e.g. meta-15 analyses) and economic analysis, with resource allocation guided by a rough criterion of 16 cost-effectiveness (Rawlins and Culver, 2004) . The technical elements of the analysis sit 17 alongside various participatory mechanisms, including a Citizen's Council (Rawlins, 2004) , 18 which is a deliberative forum designed to capture public views on the ethical dimensions of 19 healthcare priority setting (e.g. should health be valued more highly in some age groups 20 than others, etc.). In essence, the modelling process (i.e. the clinical and economic analysis) 21 purposefully turns a blind eye to the "social value judgments," leaving them free for public 22 deliberation in separate institutions (Rawlins, 2004) . However, the UK Coalition Government 23 (2010-) has expressed concerns about this division of labour, in particular with what they 24 perceive to be a lack of formality and clarity in how the deliberative panels actually inform 1 decision making. Under their proposed reforms (Department of Health, 2010), the value 2 judgments would be incorporated within the modelling process, being weighted and 3 aggregated alongside the clinical and economic data. Crucially, this was to be done in a 4 manner that is "evidence based, reflecting the views of experts," (Department of Health, 5 2010) suggesting a more limited commitment to participatory ideals. This serves as a 6 reminder that social and ethical judgments can be included within modelling approaches in 7 ways that in reality foreclose or crowd out public deliberation. 8 9 Moreover, some have criticised NICE's current appraisal process for failing to satisfy 10 deliberative ideals, on the grounds that it maintains a relatively strict separation between 11 analysis and deliberation (i.e. between fact and value), and offers limited scope for 12 meaningful public participation in the modelling process itself (e.g. the economic models are 13 designated as proprietary and so insulated from public scrutiny; Schlander, 2008) . This ties 14 in with a concern raised in other contexts, namely that even methodologies that seem well- proposed a different set of simpler, interactive modelling procedures that re-built the trust 11 of the local community as they were able to participate in exploring the possibilities of an 12 innovative flood risk management strategy. The public's role extended beyond framing the 13 modelling process (e.g. focussing on upstream storage rather than urban flood defence), to 14 contributing to the model's conceptual development (e.g. drawing on local knowledge to 15 question the data provided by a flow gauge), and participating in developing and testing 16 policy options (e.g. related to the number and height of the proposed bunds). The model 17 was ultimately based on a simple hydrological rather than hydraulic routing scheme, with 18 perhaps less scientific and technical quality than state-of-the-art methods. Yet the way that 19 it was co-constructed helped to constitute a shift towards participatory "governance," in a 20 space where the credibility of the formal authority had been in question, and where local 21 knowledge had previously been excluded from the policy process. Of course, this sort of 22 heavily participatory modelling will not be practical in most situations. But the case does 23 suggest that there may be some contexts -such as those characterised by a loss of public 24 trust and where local knowledge may play a crucial role in characterising risks and benefits -1 where it makes sense to compromise on technical dimensions of model quality, to ensure 2 that scientific evidence can be brought to bear on policy problems. 3 4
CONCLUSIONS
5
The foregoing analysis suggests that we need to extend the maxim that model quality must shaped not only by the characteristics of the policy-problem, but also by a broader set of 23 norms relating to what constitutes good decision-making, sound data, and proper use of 24 evidence. A natural question is whether this state of affairs is simply just a fact of life, or 1 whether our analysis offers some insights on how we might improve the construction and 2 use of models for policy. To this end, throughout our analysis we have emphasised not just 3 the tensions that can arise between different governance types and particular modelling 4 practices. We have also emphasised the trade-offs and adaptations that modellers have 5 made to increase the chances of their evidence being brought to bear on policy problems in 6 diverse regime types, without unduly compromising on technical quality. Remaining in this 7 normative spirit, our analysis also suggests that regulators should be explicit about the 8 regime types that they subscribe to, reflect on the way these commitments shape their 9 evaluation and use of models, and consider how alternative types might alter their 10 regulatory practices (e.g. by bringing to light various dimensions of model quality that might 11 otherwise be neglected). Together, this may help to counteract the not uncommon neglect, 12 misunderstandings, and under-utilisation of models in policy contexts, as well as reduce the 13 risks of poor choices and wasted resources in model development. 6-19. 23 
